A further point to note is that the contributors to the debate on the French Revolution tended to adopt one or other of three underlying moral theories, namely those of natural law, contractarianism, (including conservative versions of the 4 doctrine of natural rights), and utilitarianism. 9 Adherence to a particular moral theory did not distinguish conservatives from radicals in the 1790s, but rather their attitudes towards inequalities of property, rank, and power in civil society. There was, nevertheless, a relatively consistent approach adopted towards politics by the utilitarians, who tended to defend the British Constitution on the grounds of its proven track record in promoting the welfare of the country. 10 To identify Bentham's position with that of these conservatives is, however, problematic, for they were followers of William Paley's brand of so-called 'theological utilitarianism'. Bentham was always keen to distance himself from Paley, and particularly Paley's reliance on the will of God as the ultimate source of moral obligation. 11 Bentham would, perhaps, have regarded the moral and political stance of the theological utilitarians as too close to that of William Blackstone, characterized in Bentham's view by the phrase 'every thing is as it should be'. 12 In other words, they had not adopted the principle of utility as a critical, rational standard, but because it seemed to justify their own pre-existing sympathies and antipathies-it was simply in their interest to be conservative. 13 While Bentham did not contribute publicly to the Burke-Paine controversy, his writings on and for France can be used to reconstruct his position in relation to certain key issues which were at stake. I will consider a number of issues which were regarded as important by the protagonists in the debate on the French Revolutionnamely the confiscation of the property of the French Church, the British Constitution as a balanced constitution contrasted with the origin of government in the social compact, the nature of the Glorious Revolution of 1688-9, and the doctrine of natural rights-and then try to discern whether Bentham's views on these issues were consistent with any particular writer or recognizable group of writers, and in 9 Halévy's view that everyone who was writing at this time was in essence utilitarian (see E 5 particular with the Whigs, for whom I will take Boothby and James Mackintosh to be the (self-proclaimed) representatives-although this identification is itself open to dispute in certain respects.
The confiscation of the property of the Church
The reform of the French Church, which had begun in the National Assembly on 4
August 1789 with the clergy giving up their tithes and other feudal dues, and had then seen the confiscation of the estates of the clergy in return for an annual salary, had culminated in the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, promulgated on 24 August 1790.
14 According to Burke, the confiscation of Church property by the National Assembly was the central measure of the French Revolution. It violated the primary duty of society, which was to protect the property of its citizens: the state had no right to steal from one class of citizen (the clergy) in order to fulfil its posterior obligations to another (the public creditor). 15 The Revolution, claimed Burke, had been engineered by an alliance of the moneyed interest and the 'Men of Letters' against the landed interest and the Church. The 'Men of Letters', who wished to destroy the Christian religion, by pretending to have a zealous concern for the poor, and satirizing court, nobility, and priesthood, 'served as a link to unite, in favour of one object, obnoxious wealth to restless and desperate poverty'. This unprincipled alliance of the very rich and the mob had produced the attack on ecclesiastical property, which was used to service the debt incurred by the ancient monarchy. 16 The confiscation, and the subsequent creation of a paper currency founded on an eventual sale of the church lands, was an attack on religion and landed property, the two institutions which, according to Burke, formed the basis of civil society, and upon which the British Constitution was founded.
In contrast, Paine had no hesitation in defending the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. He contrasted favourably the new and more equitable arrangements for the remuneration of the French clergy with the vast disparities which existed in the Church of England, ranging from the annual income of £10,000 enjoyed by the Bishops of Durham and Winchester down to the £30 typically paid to the poor curate.
The lower and middling ranks of clergy in France had joined with the other oppressed 6
classes to obtain redress, in their case against those members of their corporation who had enjoyed enormous incomes from richly endowed benefices.
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James Mackintosh steered something of a middle course between Burke and Paine. He argued that the confiscation was justifiable in that it did not constitute an attack on private property. The land occupied by the Church was not the property of its members. The clergy were servants of the state, who received salaries for the performance of certain duties. Had they received their salaries in money, no one, observed Mackintosh, would have questioned the right of the state to regulate them.
The fact that the clergy were paid by the grant of land did not nullify the right of the state to take back possession of that land, and introduce a different mode of payment.
The land held by the clergy was, therefore, distinguishable from private property, which was held for the benefit of the individual proprietor, who enjoyed unlimited rights over it. Nor was the property of the Church equivalent to that owned by a private corporation, which was a voluntary association for the benefit of its members, each of whom was an absolute sharer in the property. The priesthood was a corporation, but endowed by the state, and established for the benefit of others. Its members had no separate, and the body no collective, right of property. They were merely entrusted with the administration of the lands from which their salaries were paid. 18 The distinction between private and ecclesiastical property drawn by Mackintosh rested on his distinction between 'those fundamental acts which constitute society' and which were 'essential to the social state', and 'those public acts' which were 'subsequent and subordinate'. Private property belonged to the former category, while the formation and endowment of public corporations belonged to the latter. been blended in the British constitution, 27 and John Bowles observed that the constitution blended together all three simple forms of government, securing the advantages and escaping the inconveniences they produced separately.
28
The standard doctrine further maintained that the mixed constitution was complemented by two further devices, that of the separation of powers and that of the balance of powers. The separation of powers, explained Paley, referred to the way in which the executive, legislative, and judicial powers of the state were distributed amongst different individuals and institutions, and was intended to secure the happiness of subjects. In Britain, the executive power was lodged solely in the King; the legislative, though lodged in King, House of Lords, and House of Commons, was peculiarly associated with the latter, since it was there that laws usually originated;
and the judicial was lodged in independent magistrates. The balance of powers referred to the mutual checks imposed on the constituent parts of the legislature, and was intended to secure the preservation of the government. The main function of the Lords was to mediate between King and Commons, thus ensuring that the constitution did not degenerate into royal despotism on the one side or popular anarchy on the other. 29 According to Burke, the beauty of the British constitution lay in the balance of powers:
The whole scheme of our mixed constitution is to prevent any one of its principles from being carried as far, as taken by itself, and theoretically, it would go. [...] To avoid the perfections of extreme, all its several parts are so constituted, as not alone to answer their own several ends, but also each to limit and controul the others: insomuch, that take which of the principles you please-you will find its operation checked and stopped at a certain point. The whole movement stands still rather than that any part should proceed beyond its boundary. 
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The standard doctrine was that the role of each branch of the mixed constitution was related to the attributes which were associated with each simple form of government considered in itself. Civil government required a combination of power, wisdom, and goodness. Monarchy provided power and the aristocracy provided wisdom, while the democracy ensured that these were directed towards the good of the whole. 31 The analogy between the attributes of the respective elements of the British constitution and those of the divine Trinity was, again, standard doctrine.
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All of this was rejected by Paine, for whom the legitimacy of government was determined by its origin: 'To possess ourselves of a clear idea of what government is or ought to be, we must trace it to its origin. In doing this we shall easily discover that governments must have arisen, either out of the people, or over the people'. A legitimate government was one that had arisen out of the people, in other words a government founded by means of the social contract, albeit not one entered into by governors and governed, but one entered into by each individual acting in his own sovereign right. 33 Hence, the constitution preceded the government: 'a government is only the creature of a constitution. The constitution of a country is not the act of its government, but of the people constituting a government'. The government was bound to act in accordance with the constitution, in the same way that a court of law was bound to act in accordance with the laws subsequently made by that government.
As far as Paine was concerned, England did not have a constitution. The English government originated in the Norman Conquest, and consequently arose over the people: 'and though it has been much modified since the time of William the Conqueror, the country has never yet regenerated itself, and it is therefore without a constitution'. 34 In contrast, the French were in the very process of forming a government which originated out of the people. The National Assembly was 'the personal social compact', its members consisting of the delegates of the nation with the authority to form a constitution. Future assemblies would have authority only to legislate 'according to the principles and forms prescribed in that constitution'. 
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Paine drew out the implications of this for the branches of the British Constitution.
Applauding the abolition of aristocratic titles in France, he recommended the same measure in Britain. 36 Noting that in France, the king was merely an official, while sovereignty was in the nation, he made the point that, in Britain, the king was the source of sovereignty, and the House of Commons was merely 'a grant or boon'
received by the people from the king.
37
Paine elicited a mixed response from the reform-minded Whigs. On the one hand, he found an ally in his dissatisfaction with the theory of the mixed monarchy in
Mackintosh, who came down in favour of a simple representative legislature. He presented three arguments against a constitution of mutual control. First, he appealed to the notion of the general will. The social body was a unity, and a unity could have only one will. A division of the legislature, whereby the national will as manifested by the nation's representatives might be negatived, was a usurpation of popular sovereignty. Second, a senate would be dominated by sectional interests opposed to the national will. Third, the so-called government of balance and control which was supposed to exist in Britain was illusory. The Lords and Commons, which were supposed to control each other, were in fact both dominated by the same class of men, the rich, whose interest it was to protect their own privileged situation. 38 On the other hand, Paine was criticized by Boothby for his argument that a constitution preceded government, and the related doctrine of the sovereign of the people. To Paine's view that 'a constitution is a thing antecedent to government, and a government is only the creature of a constitution', Boothby retorted that a constitution was an aggregate composed of all the laws, institutions, and establishments by which a country was governed, and as such the constitution could not 'be antecedent to' the elements of which it was composed. 39 In similar vein, in response to Paine's claim that 'the constitution of a country is not the act of its government, but of the people constituting a government', Boothby pointed out that to speak of a 'country' or a 'people' was to assume the existence of an already existing constitution. 2011) 13 man in society was that resulting from the institutions of society. A people could only exist, be known, and have a right to act through these institutions, which were formed by agreement, the social compact. When this compact was destroyed, there was no longer a people. Men who once had a corporate existence became nothing more than a number of separate individuals. This was a state of 'rude nature', where there was neither majority nor minority, nor power in any one person to bind any other. The power of a majority was legitimate only if an association was produced by unanimity, and if the act of the majority was thereupon recognized as the act of the whole, and thus binding on the whole. Hence, should men dissolve their government in order to remodel their community, each man had a right to remain an individual. Any number of individuals who agreed had a right to form a separate and independent community.
If any one was forced to associate with another, this was conquest and not compact.
Burke's point was that the people of France, granted that they had dissolved the compact on which their old government had rested, had no right to form a new one on the basis of the will of the majority. The majority had no right to create or alter the government. Such a right belonged to the whole community, in which the natural aristocracy, or the assembly appointed to represent it, acted in its proper place, with its proper weight, and without being subjected to violence. But in this case, added Burke, it was doubtful whether any rash or desperate changes could ever be made.
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William Cusac Smith, who allied himself with Burke , and in particular with his views on prescription, adopted Rousseau's device of the general will, which he interpreted as the general will of the nation as manifested in the fundamental constitution of the state. He contrasted the general will with the will of the majority, which allowed him to oppose the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people. Referring to Paine's argument that one generation could not bind another, Smith noted that it was impossible to distinguish one generation from the next. It made no sense to talk about the right of each generation to legislate for itself, since a generation was a nonentity, and, therefore, did not have rights. Indeed, successive generations were so intimately connected that what was established by one did not infringe the rights of another. Rather, the basis of such establishments rested upon something compounded of parental authority and the acquiescence of children. In time, the rising generation became the parents themselves. Nature, in demonstrating the way in which 41 Neither the parliament nor the people of 1688 had any right to bind succeeding generations: 'Every generation is and must be competent to all the purposes which its 50 Ibid., pp. Government, that the question as to whether the people owed obedience to their government should not be determined on the basis of whether the governors ruled in accordance with a contract, whether real or imaginary, but whether resistance would be conducive to the happiness of the community. 55 The same argument told against Paine's view-and indeed the views of Mackintosh and Boothby (and, as we shall see, Fox) to the extent that they agreed with Paine on this point-that it was the way in which a government originated which determined, or at least had a bearing on, its legitimacy.
Natural Rights
The (ibid., pp. 118-22) ), he denied that every civil right grew out of a natural right. On the contrary, the two were frequently incompatible (ibid., pp. 80-96).
natural right in full integrity and vigour, and it was fallacious, therefore, of Burke to deny that man in a social state was precluded from any appeal to natural right. One of the rights which men in society retained was that of 'a right to share in their own Government, because the exercise of the right by one man is not inconsistent with its possession by another, which is evidently the only case where the surrender of a natural right can be exacted by society'. According to Burke's logic, all governments, including tyrannies, were equally legitimate, for if it was government itself which determined the rights which men possessed in societies, it was government which set its own standard. 58 But there was more to it than Paine recognized, for Mackintosh's ultimate justification for natural rights was, in essence, a version of what would today be termed indirect utilitarianism. All rights, whether natural or civil, claimed Mackintosh, were founded on general expediency-on a utility that was paramount and perpetual. But once particular rights had been established, they formed the criteria of moral rectitude-the question then was not whether an action was useful, but whether it was right. No subordinate expediency could then justify the infraction of these rights.
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Boothby was much less sympathetic towards Paine than Mackintosh, albeit not so hostile to the French Declaration of Rights as Burke. He agreed with Burke's critique of the doctrine of natural rights, stating that in a pure state of nature, as was assumed to have existed prior to the formation of society, the rights of every individual must have been co-equal with his natural powers, capacities, and wants.
After the formation of society, his rights were determined by the laws and institutions of the society into which he was born. Such social rights would vary with circumstances, and could not, therefore, be reduced to any definite or immutable principles. When Paine asked whether Burke meant to deny that man had any rights, the latter would probably have answered that he was satisfied with the civil rights secured to him by the laws of the society to which he belonged. 60 As far as the French Declaration of Rights was concerned, while arguing that the philosophical principles which underlay it were at best problematical and obscure, Boothby was prepared to admit that this uncertainty created little practical mischief. should be equally bound by the law; that every man should have the power of doing everything which the law did not prohibit; that no man should be imprisoned or otherwise molested but as the law prescribed; that there should be religious toleration and liberty of the press; that taxes should be equally distributed, and imposed by the representatives of the people; that the agents or ministers of the government should be liable to public impeachment; and that property should be inviolable. 61 In short, the Declaration of Rights was an attempt to grasp and express the principles of the Glorious Revolution.
It is tempting to argue that Bentham was closer to Burke on the question of prescription than he was prepared to acknowledge, especially if the Burkean position is reconstructed from a utilitarian perspective: namely, that the laws and institutions inherited from the past had a tendency to enshrine utility. 62 But this is to underestimate the differences between them, since, for Bentham, the mere existence of an institution did not in itself constitute anything like a sufficient ground for supporting its continuance: on the contrary, an existing institution was just as, if not more, likely to be a depository of absurdity than of wisdom. Yet this is not to say that 
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protection of the remainder. In the case of religious rights, to ask a man to relinquish them was to ask the impossible-no state could compel it, and no state ought to require it, because it was not in the power of man to comply. With Burke no doubt in mind, Fox continued:
But there were those who said, although a man could not help his
opinions, yet that, unless under certain restrictions, they ought not to be made public; for that whatever rights a man naturally had, he gave them all up when he came into society, and that therefore religious liberty, among the rest, must be modified for the good of society; so that by the liberty of man was meant nothing more than that which was convenient to the state in which he lived, and under this idea penalties on religion were deemed expedient. This he took to be a radical error, and for the reason … that it was not in the power of man to surrender his opinion, and therefore the society which demanded him to make this sacrifice, demanded an impossibility. What then did this lead to-that no man should be deprived of any part of his liberty, with respect to his opinions, unless his actions derived from such opinions were clearly prejudicial to the State. one hand, to distance himself from Paine, who, he said, advocated a change in the form of government, but, on the other hand, to express his support for moderate and temperate reform. 65 As for the danger of innovation, he thought that the greatest innovation that could be made in the constitution would be a vote that there should be no innovation. The greatest beauty of the constitution was that it allowed perpetual improvement, which time and circumstances rendered necessary. The French
Revolution had been justified because the old government had been so detestable that it was not possible to introduce improvements.
66
Bentham gave short shrift to all these arguments, which assumed that natural rights, in some form or other, had some form of existence. His own fundamental ground for opposing the doctrine of natural rights was ontological: natural rights simply did not exist. Rights were the product of a legal system, which itself was the product of human legislators. The proponents of natural rights either assumed that the rights in question simply existed, or that God had created them. Neither view was tenable. Furthermore, to claim that such rights were imprescriptible was to make a further nonsensical claim: hence, 'Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense, nonsense upon stilts'. 67 In order to make any sense of the French Declaration of Rights, it had to be interpreted as a series of moral claims, but even then it was full of absurdities and inconsistencies.
68

Conclusion
In relation to the issues considered here, Bentham was not in close agreement with any of the major contributors, nor did he belong to any one of the parties, involved in the debate generated by the French Revolution. On the one hand, he rejected the doctrine of the rights of man, which put him at odds with radicals such as Paine and 72 He was also prepared to criticize the republican or democratic form of government, both because of the lack of intelligence amongst the people, and because of its tendency to anarchy and war, a common theme of conservative writers. 73 As for the lack of intelligence, the acquisition of the necessary knowledge to make laws was a long and difficult process, and was beyond the capacity of the ordinary person, yet in a democracy, 'every man must be equal to the whole business of government'. This was to ignore the benefits of the division of labour. It was better to 'employ one man to make laws for you as you employ another man to make shoes', for just as you thereby got better shoes, you would also get better laws. And just as it was cheaper for a man to buy shoes from a shoemaker than to make them himself, it was also cheaper to employ others to make laws than to make them himself. The people were 'all will', and lacked 'reason' and 'understanding'; they were 'intolerant' and 'too ignorant to doubt', and would brook no disagreement; they were interested only in personalities, and not in the real merits of measures. As for the tendency to anarchy and war, Bentham noted that energy was the characteristic feature of the republican: 'This energy is in plain English the propensity to cut throats-the appetite for blood'. In France, extermination had 73 Conservative thinkers repeatedly emphasized the dangers of democracy, which they regarded as all too liable to degenerate into anarchy. They argued that the most inveterate problem experienced by democracy arose from the very principle on which it was founded, namely the equality of all the members of the state. The possession of wealth, abilities, or reputation-the source of public virtue, industry, and exertion-were incompatible with republican citizenship. The essence of the democratic state was contest-all were forced into competition. Internally, the energies of men were directed towards the struggle for executive power, while externally it was aggressive, and indeed more prone to war than even an absolute monarchy. The confusion created by internal discord and foreign aggression gave ambitious men the opportunity to establish arbitrary rule, whether the despotism of one man or the oligarchy of several. and 'From violence an alternation and mixture of anarchy and oppression'. 75 All this was in stark contrast to the security provided under the British Constitution, where government was conducted by the well-informed classes and ministers with the necessary expertise took the lead in legislation, and the representative system did not require all MPs to be returned by the suffrage of the ill-informed classes. Moreover, the limited duration of parliaments, the ability of the people to exchange opinions, and the responsibility of the executive, provided security against bad government.
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In the 1790s Bentham did not see himself as some sort of political agitator, but rather, as David Lieberman has pointed out, as a 'projector'. 77 His role was to devise schemes for legislators-schemes founded on the universal standard of the principle of utility, but sensitive to the political, social, and economic constraints which legislators faced (for instance, he attempted to incorporate the National Assembly's commitment to the popular election of judges into his scheme for a new judicial establishment for France) 78 -which was very much a continuation of his efforts earlier in the 1780s to promote himself as a codifier to various sovereigns in Europe.
Furthermore, he continued through the 1790s and beyond in his role as 'projector'-most notably in his project for the panopticon prison scheme, but also in his attempts to reform the poor laws and establish industry houses on the inspection principle, and in his proposals for financial reform which he finally abandoned in 1801.
Mary Mack, having claimed that Bentham was converted to political radicalism in 1790, then suggests that, in the light of government suppression of radical activity, he became politically quiescent for tactical reasons, and that, when he began to write on parliamentary reform in 1809, he picked up where he had left off twenty years earlier. 79 Mack's view is untenable. In 1792-3 Bentham wrote: 'Security stands before equality: because where there is most inequality, no man's condition, the condition of the lowest is not so bad, but that want of security may make it worse'.
In the 1790s Bentham was pursuing a strategy of promoting security-through panopticon, poor law reform, and financial reform-in response to what he saw as the threat to social order emanating from France. This was not a 'tactical withdrawal' 81 from radical politics, but a sincere contribution to the attempt to maintain, and indeed extend, the benefits enjoyed under the British Constitution. The implications of seeing Bentham's 'projects' from this political perspective in these years will need to be worked out, but at least this interpretation, I suggest, provides the correct framework for doing so. 
